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Abstract
Theoretical work in behavioral economics aims to modify assumptions of
standard neoclassical models of individual decision-making to better comport with
observed behavior. The alternative assumptions fall into at least two categories: nonstandard preferences and psychological mistakes. Applications of behavioral economics
models in law, however, tend to assume that deviations from standard neoclassical
models are meant to build in psychological mistakes that produce regrettable choices.
Often follow-on policy prescriptions suggest interventions that either help individuals
choose correctly or go further to substitute the “correct” choices for those that mistakeprone individuals might choose in error. Such policy prescriptions are ill suited in cases
where the applied behavioral economics model assumes non-standard preferences as
opposed to psychological mistakes. This essay provides examples of models in each
category and examples of mistaken applications of models that assume non-standard
preferences rather than psychological mistakes. It also suggests ways to avoid errors
when applying behavioral economics theories in law.
Keywords: behavioral economics, legal scholarship, rationality, psychological mistakes
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1 Introduction
The subfield of behavioral economics has gained substantial traction. Motivated
in large part by observed behavior that does not comport with predictions derived from
neoclassical economic models of individual decision-making, 2 behavioral economists
have employed insights from the field of psychology to modify assumptions to sharpen
the models’ predictive power. Behavioral economics has taken root, so much so that
publishers now sell textbooks dedicated solely to it (see, e.g., Wilkinson and Klaes 2018;
Cartwright 2014; Angner 2012), and students are offered semester-long courses on the
subject.3
Modifications of neoclassical model assumptions can be organized into at least
two categories. The first category is a collection of assumptions that recognizes human
fallibility grounded in psychological influences.4 While neoclassical models assume that
humans are able to ignore irrelevant alternatives, accurately weight the likelihood of
uncertain outcomes, and interpret information in an unbiased fashion, behavior observed
both in experimental laboratories and in the field supports alternative assumptions that
humans sometimes err in systematic ways. For example, clearly irrelevant alternatives
appear to sometimes impact choices (see, e.g., Huber et al. 1982). Some evidence
suggests we tend to overweight relatively small probability events and underweight
relatively large probability events (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Pidgeon et al. 1992).
We sometimes underweight the likelihood of negative outcomes (Scheier et al. 1994;
Weinstein 1980). We tend to attach excessively high probabilities to ex ante uncertain
2

I use the terms “neoclassical economics models,” “rational choice theory,” and “standard
economics models” interchangeably.
3

The rise of behavioral economics in law is an example of what Guido Calabresi (2016: 2-5)
refers to as “Law and Economics,” the altering of economic theory to fit the reality of legal
environments. He contrasts this with “Economic Analysis of Law,” which labels reality as
irrational if it does not comport with predictions from theories built up from first principles. For
another view on the distinction between “law and economics” and “economic analysis of law,”
see Harnay and Marciano (2009).
4

I use the term “psychological mistakes” to distinguish mistakes caused by psychological
influences from those caused by, for example, a lack of perfect information and inability to
perfectly predict uncertain future events. Standard economic theory sometimes predicts such nonpsychological mistakes or inefficiencies.
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outcomes if we know the outcome occurred (see, e.g., Walster 1967; Fischhoff 1975). We
sometimes incorrectly interpret information about uncertain events in ways that serve our
own interests (see, e.g., Arkin et al. 1980). These psychological tendencies lead to
choices we might regret if, in fact, judgment errors cause them.
The second category of assumption modifications relates to preferences. This set
of revised theories assumes deviations from a set of standard preferences built into
neoclassical models of individual choice. For example, under conditions of uncertainty,
standard expected utility theory assumes that individuals consider the expected value of
possible outcomes5 and tend to be averse to risk (i.e., we tend to strictly prefer $5 to a
coin flip that will pay $0 for heads and $10 for tails) (Pratt 1964). The standard model
also assumes that utility (or happiness) is derived from potential final states of the world
(i.e., the piles of stuff I might end up with after uncertainty is resolved). Models of
intertemporal choice assume that individual preferences over waiting are constant over
time. In other words, we assume that individuals have constant discount rates across time
(Samuelson 1937).6 Standard models also tend to assume that individuals are wholly selfinterested, which implies that they ignore potential changes in others’ utility.
Again, observed behavior often fails to support these assumptions. For example,
in addition to final states of the world, evidence suggests that one’s happiness sometimes
depends on outcomes relative to some starting point7 or relative to one’s expectations
over outcomes (Kőszegi and Rabin 2006). In addition to reflecting risk aversion, some
observed choices suggest an aversion to perceived expected losses (Kahneman and
Tyersky 1979). When it comes to patience, some observed behavior suggests discount
rates are systematically inconsistent over time (Strotz 1955). A substantial collection of
evidence supports theories assuming “bounded self-interest” or social preferences
(Preston 1961). As opposed to psychological mistakes, these non-standard preferences,
conditional on what explains them, lead to choices that do not necessarily generate regret.
5

Standard models alternatively assume that individuals assign either objective or subjective
probabilities to uncertain outcomes (Schoemaker 1982).
6

For example, if one prefers $110 in one month to $100 today, then $110 in 1 year and 1 month
is preferred to $100 in one year.
7

The starting point is often referred to as a reference point (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
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In other words, the tendencies might simply reflect preferences that differ from those
built into standard economics models.
Despite the important distinctions between these two categories, scholars who
import behavioral economics models into legal analyses sometimes mistakenly assume
that deviations from the standard model reflect psychological mistakes or some level of
irrationality. Behavioral economics as applied in law has morphed into a theory of
mistakes (see generally Wright and Stone 2012; Levinson 2012).8 The purpose of this
essay is to provide examples of mischaracterizations by scholars of deviations from
standard economics model assumptions, to argue that such mischaracterizations might
have important implications, and to suggest ways scholars can avoid mischaracterizing
non-standard preferences as mistakes. 9 Unfortunately, the final objective is sometimes
surprisingly difficult, often due to the ambiguity around the notion of rationality in
economics and the lack of clarity about the nature of assumptions in work that offers new
theories to explain observed behavior. I do not aim to resolve the ambiguity here, but
only to offer pointers scholars might consider when navigating the muddy waters to draw
normative implications from applications of behavioral economics to law.
Part II reviews some of the standard assumptions employed in economics models
and summarizes a (necessarily oversimplified) version of the concept of rationality. Part
III briefly describes a handful of examples of behavioral economics assumptions that fall
into the first category, psychological mistakes. Part IV lists other behavioral economics
assumptions that imply non-standard preferences as opposed to mistakes. It also provides
examples of mistaken applications in legal scholarship and argues that such mistakes
8

Wright and Stone (2012: 860-861) explain, “Behavioral economics examines ways in which
economic actors deviate from predicted conduct under rational choice assumptions—in other
words, how and why actors behave irrationally. Behavioral law and economics attempts to apply
these insights through policy measures designed to systematically ‘debias’ firms and individuals.”
Levinson (2012: n.1) similarly states, “Behavioral law and economics is the study of how
cognitive biases or limitations predictably affect decision-makers' behavior in ways that cause the
behavior to deviate from what is economically beneficial.”
9

Thanks to Eyal Zamir for reminding me that scholars might also make the opposite mistake—
mistaking theories grounded in psychological mistakes for theories grounded in non-standard
preferences. These errors are equally as concerning as those I focus on here. In the same vein,
economics and psychologists, in addition to legal scholars, sometimes make mistakes when
characterizing assumptions.
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have important implications, especially when it comes to normative conclusions.10 Part V
offers some rules of thumb for avoiding faulty applications. Part VI concludes.
2 The Standard Model and the Concept of Rationality
Joseph Stiglitz (1993: 28), in his best-selling economics textbook, characterizes
rational choice as being grounded in the assumption that “people weigh the costs and
benefits of each possibility.” He goes on to explain that this assumption is “based on the
expectation that individuals…will act in a consistent manner, with a reasonably welldefined notion of what they like and what their objectives are, and with a reasonable
understanding of how to attain those objectives” (Stiglitz 1993: 29). The basic steps of
rational choice, according to Stiglitz (1993: 42-47), are first to identify all possible
choices, second to define the tradeoffs triggered by each choice, and third to choose after
correctly calculating opportunity costs and marginal costs, while ignoring sunk costs.11
Each choice results in an outcome (or expected outcome), and rational choice theory
assumes one is able to rank the outcomes based on how each impacts one’s utility.12
10

It is important to note here that I did not canvas the entire literature to collect sufficient
evidence to make claims about the prevalence of mistakes about mistakes. Examples were
relatively easy to find, however. In addition, overly narrow definitions and characterizations of
the field are quite common (e.g., “Behavioral economics is one of the most significant
developments in economics over the past thirty-six years. The field combines economics and
psychology to produce a body of evidence that individual choice behavior departs from that
predicted by neoclassical economics in a number of decisionmaking situations. These departures
from rational choice behavior are said to be the result of the individual’s “cognitive biases,” that
is, systematic failures to act in one’s own interest because of defects in one’s decisionmaking
process. The documentation of these cognitive biases in laboratory experiments has been
behavioral economics’ primary contribution to microeconomics. These biases, behavioral
economists assert, demonstrate systematically irrational choice behavior by individuals and firms.
This irrational behavior, in turn, breaks the link between revealed preference and individual
welfare upon which neoclassical economic theory depends.” (Wright and Ginsberg, 2012, p.
1034); “…B[ehavioral] L[aw and] E[conomics] relies, at its core, on the concept that people
make predictable errors in judgment.” (Rachlinski, 2011, p. 1682)
11

Opportunity cost is the lost opportunity from forgoing the next best alternative. Marginal cost is
the cost incurred when one decides to engage in the next increment of the chosen activity (e.g.,
the cost of increasing the size of one’s army by one additional soldier). Sunk costs are past
expenditures that cannot be undone.
12

Standard models are framed in terms of decision utility, as described in the text. Behavioral
models sometimes employ the notion of experienced utility, which refers to one’s hedonic
experience associated with an outcome. Inability to predict how different outcomes might impact
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Extreme versions of rational choice theory assume that individuals are wholly
self-interested. 13 In other words, we understand how different choices that result in
various outcomes impact our utility, and we choose the option that produces the utilitymaximizing outcome. Under conditions of uncertainty, where several known states of the
world are possible, rational choice theory assumes that individuals operate under the
assumptions of expected utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). Expected
values are calculated using known probabilities of possible states of the world, expected
values are translated into expected utilities and the choice resulting in the largest
expected utility is selected. In line with observed behavior, expected utility models often
assume some level of risk aversion. When new information is learned, individuals update
their beliefs about the likelihood of potential outcomes using, say, Bayes’ Rule (Bayes
and Price 1763). Rational choice theory models generally assume consistent preferences
over time, while standard discounted utility models assume exponential discounting
functions (Meyer 1976).
More technical conceptualizations of rationality assume that attitudes and
preferences follow basic principles of logic and probability theory, are coherent, and are
independent of immaterial or irrelevant factors (Shafir and Le Boeuf 2002). The standard
model assumes that individuals are able to formulate preference relations, which specify
how each possible choice compares with all other possible choices (Mas-Colell et al.
1995: 6).14 Preference relations are often characterized as rational (or well-behaved) if
they are complete (all choices are compared to every other possible choice), transitive (if
A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then A is preferred to C), and reflexive (each
choice is equally as good as itself) (Mas-Colell et al. 1995: 6-7 n.30). Other rational
preference relation characteristics include cancellation and invariance (Wilkinson and
our experienced happiness is the basis for some behavioral economics models (see, e.g.
Kahneman and Thaler 2006). Behavioral economics has introduced a variety of utilities (e.g.,
anticipatory utility, diagnostic utility, remembered utility, real-time utility, and residual utility)
(see Wilkinson and Klaes 2018: 93-100). These distinctions, while generally important, are
outside this essay’s scope.
13

Less extreme versions are flexible about the nature of the preferences driving choices. For one
view of the assumptions’ history and development, see Jeffrey Harrison (1985).
14

If A and B are the only choices, an individual might prefer A to B, or prefer B to A, or be
indifferent between them.
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Klaes 2018: 68). A preference relation satisfies cancellation if immaterial or irrelevant
factors do not change preference orderings (Wilkinson and Klaes 2018: 68). Invariance is
satisfied if different representations of the choice problem yield the same preference
relation.
Behavioral economics characterizes deviations from these assumptions as either
psychological mistakes or non-standard preferences. The next Part provides examples of
deviations that belong in the mistake category. Part 4 focuses on deviations related to
non-standard preferences.
3 Psychological Mistakes
Standard economic theory generally assumes that observed choices reveal a
chooser’s preferences (Samuelson 1937). This is not to say, though, that standard theories
do not predict choices that individuals might later regret. Imperfect information, costly
information, and uncertainty over outcomes, for example, might lead to ex post
regrettable choices. Neoclassical economics assumes, however, that, under such
conditions, individual choices maximize ex ante expected utility. This implies that
interventions beyond the provision of information cannot improve choices.
Much of behavioral economics theory aims to infuse standard economic models
with realistic assumptions that better reflect human fallibility. Starting with a list of
observed phenomena derived from the field of psychology, behavioral economists update
standard models to account for mistake-making in an effort to improve the models’
predictive power. The mistakes behavioralists focus on often cannot be avoided simply
by providing information.
Psychological mistakes seem to arise from a number of phenomena. Evidence
suggests psychological hurdles in assessing the likelihood of possible, unknown states of
the world. Tversky and Kahneman (1974), for example, report evidence of the anchoringand-adjustment heuristic, which triggers disproportionate influence of irrelevant
information initially presented (e.g., one’s social security number) over guesses about
facts unknown to the guesser, such as the population of New Guinea. In addition,
Kahneman et al. (1982) summarize abundant evidence suggesting that individuals often
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overweight low-likelihood events, like winning the lottery. Croson and Sundali (2005)
summarize evidence of individual susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy—for example,
believing tails is “due” after a fair coin flipped a number of times produces a string of
heads. Seemingly countless other such biases and heuristics have found support in
reported data (Wilkinson and Klaes 2018: 120-137).
In addition, some behavioral economics models predict regrettable choices in
cases in which individuals experience strong emotions before or during decision-making.
Lowenstein (2000) observes that “visceral factors often drive people to behave in ways
that they view as contrary to their own self-interest.” Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2010:
1056) report evidence suggesting that “[e]ffective emotion regulation seems to be a
critical success factor in [investment] trading.” Elster (1996: 1391) argues that emotions
play several different roles in human decision-making, including but not limited to
“interfere[ing] with belief formation, by inducing self-serving or overly optimistic
beliefs.”
Although behavioral economics has contributed greatly to our understanding of
psychological mistakes, it is not focused solely on mistake-making. A second class of
behavioral economics theories, which focuses on non-standard preferences, attempts to
explain anomalous choices by assuming a set of preferences that deviate from the set
commonly embedded in rational choice theory models. The key difference is that the
anomalous choices predicted by this second class of models are not mistakes. Instead
they merely reflect preferences not accounted for in standard economic models (e.g.,
preferences over inequality of distributions and preferences over loss avoidance).
The following Part provides examples from two vast literatures, one attempting to
explain observed reluctance to trade and another focusing on inconsistent preferences for
patience over time.
4 Non-Standard Preferences
A number of assumptions related to the nature of preferences are baked into
rational choice theory models. Observed behavior that does not comport with rational
choice theory predictions has prompted behavioral economists to posit various features of
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preferences that diverge from standard assumptions. Despite the divergence, the theories
assume that such preferences are rational in the sense that they do not lead to regrettable
mistakes. This part summarizes two sets of behavioral economics theories that assume
non-standard, rational preferences.15
4.1 Reluctance to Trade Endowed Items
One of the most well known anomalies economists study is the observed
difference between willingness to pay and willingness to accept.16 Standard economic
models generally assume that valuations of items are independent of one’s endowment
(or ownership) status. In contrast to this assumption, in both laboratory and field
experiments, researchers have observed valuation gaps—reported valuations for an
endowed item that exceed those for the same item when it is not endowed. In some
experiments subjects are asked whether they want to trade an endowed item for an
alternative item of similar market value. In these experimental environments, we
commonly observe exchange asymmetries—subjects seem reluctant to give up their
endowed items in exchange for the alternative.17

15

Others exist. The discussion here is meant only to provide examples. Furthermore, it’s
important to reiterate that the theoretical and empirical literatures related to each of the examples
provided in this Part are vast. Each contains multiple theories, some assuming non-standard
preferences and some assuming psychological mistakes. Some theories have found more support
in the data than others, but each literature contains multiple theories that are able to explain
substantial portions of existing data. Those who import behavioral economics theories into legal
scholarship sometimes mistake theories of non-standard preferences for theories of mistakes, and
they also fail to acknowledge theories other than the one (or few) they apply and draw normative
claims from. Both oversights lead to confusion in legal scholarship.
16

Willingness to pay is measured by the most amount of money one is willing to exchange to
obtain some item. Willingness to accept is measured by the least amount of money one is willing
to accept in exchange for giving up an endowed item.
17

This general phenomenon is commonly known as the “endowment effect.” This term causes
confusion, however, because it connotes a particular explanation, that the endowment somehow
causes the observed effect. While some theories focus on the endowed nature of the good, several
competing theories that focus on other features of the contexts are able to explain large swaths of
observed choices. Thus, neutral labels such as “valuation gap” and “exchange asymmetry” are
less likely to confuse the reader or compel placing excessive weight on one theory over others.
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Economists have posited several theories to explain observed reluctance to trade
one’s endowment for some other item or for money.18 Endowment theory, recently
replaced by theories with better predictive power, was a leading contender for over a
decade. This theory is an application of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory
to contexts of riskless choice (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). The model deviates from
the assumptions of rational choice theory in three ways.19 First, the model assumes that
preferences are reference point dependent: choices depend on where one begins, “usually
correspond[ing] to [one’s] current position, …[but one’s reference point] can also be
influenced by aspirations, expectations, norms, and social comparisons” (Tversky and
Kahneman 1991: 1046-1047).20 This differs from the rational choice theory assumption
that individuals consider only the impact final outcomes have on utility. Second, the
model assumes that individuals are averse to losses in the sense that “losses loom larger
than corresponding gains” (Tversky and Kahneman 1991: 1039). Third, the authors posit
that sensitivity to marginal gains and marginal losses diminishes with distance from one’s
starting point.
Despite these deviations from rational choice theory, the theory’s authors do not
assume that preferences of the type they posit are irrational per se (Tversky and
Kahneman 1991: 1057-1058). They argue that the normative status of the assumptions
must be judged by “a prediction of the quality of the experience of [a] consequence” in
the relevant decision context. Tversky and Kahneman further argue that “a bias in favor
of the status quo can be justified if the disadvantages of any change will be experienced
more keenly than its advantages.” (p. 1057; emphasis added) They then provide examples
of circumstances that might not trigger reluctance to trade:
18

For a comprehensive review of the literature, see Zeiler (2018). In addition to summarizing the
numerous theories that might explain observed reluctance to trade, the review critiques
techniques used by empiricist to elicit choices. Such controversies exist in most if not all
economics literatures. Unfortunately, scholars who import theories from economics and
psychology into legal analyses often gloss over such inherent messiness.
19

The authors employ an additional set of technical assumptions that are irrelevant for our
purposes.
20

Much evidence suggests that one’s endowment does not impact valuation and thus does not
support endowment theory. A substantial portion of existing data, however, supports alternative
theories (e.g., Kőszegi and Rabin 2006) that assume that reference points are set by expectations
and not endowments (see Zeiler 2018).
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“[S]ome reference levels that are naturally adopted in the context of
decision are irrelevant to the subsequent experience of outcomes, and the
impact of such reference levels on decision is normatively dubious. In
evaluating a decision that has long-term consequences, for example, the
initial response to these consequences may be relatively unimportant, if
adaptation eventually induces a shift of reference. Another case involves
principal-agent relations: the principal may not wish the agent’s decision
to reflect the agent’s aversion to losses, because the agent’s reference level
has no bearing on the principal’s experience of outcomes.” (p. 1057-58)
Despite these important and explicit nuances, a number of scholars have argued
that observed reluctance to trade violates rationality. Jolls et al. (1998: 1545) point to
prospect theory as an example of “bounded rationality” despite the fact that the theory’s
authors have explicitly claimed that at least some of the theory’s posited deviations from
standard theory are not per se irrational (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Fried (2013:
1255) infers that behavioral economics scholars have concluded that reluctance to trade is
irrational because such reluctance suggests that valuation depends on something other
than the actual utility of the endowed item.21 Similarly, Levinson (2012: 593-594), in an
article titled “Superbias,” describes observed reluctance to trade as “irrational” behavior.
He also claims that valuations of owned goods are excessively high and reluctance to
trade is “considered economically irrational because the inflation of perceived worth
inhibits the transfer of goods at what might otherwise be a desirable price.” (p. 607)
Levinson cites to several experimental studies and literature reviews, but not to the
primary source of endowment theory, Tversky and Kahneman’s 1991 article, which
makes clear that aversion to loss is not per se irrational. Buccafusco and Sprigman (2010:
42-43) discuss results from an experiment designed to study the impact of ownership of
intellectual property on valuation, claiming that an owner “might demand, in part due to
21

None of the works Fried cites to support the claim of irrationality actually claim that reluctance
to trade is irrational. In fact, two cited articles (Korobkin 2003: 1280; Korobkin 1998: 666-667)
claim that the endowment effect is not per se irrational. Fried (2013: 1260) also refers to loss
aversion and reference dependence as “cognitive biases.”
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an endowment effect, an irrational amount of money to license her song to another user
who wants to use part of the song as a sample in a new work.”
Some descriptions are more nuanced. For example, Jones and Brosnan (2008), in
an important article explaining the usefulness of bringing cognitive science to bear on
behavioral economics theories, describe experiments related to reluctance to trade. They
claim that the “propensity to value an item not solely on the characteristics of the item
itself, but also according to abstract notions of ownership, suggests that people are often
pricing goods and rights irrationally.” Jones and Brosnan (2008: f.12) recognize that
some have questioned whether reluctance to trade signals irrational preferences22 but
conclude that “[r]egardless of terminology, the key point is that the change in preference
seems irrational, and if it is so, then even ‘rational’ pursuit of an irrational preference can
make problems for law.” Jones and Brosnan (2008: 1951) also refer to loss aversion as a
“seemingly irrational predisposition.”
Assuming that reluctance to trade is irrational when the cited theory is not
grounded in such an assumption has important implications when it comes to forwarding
normative legal claims. Generally, if reference dependence and loss aversion are rational
characteristics of individual preferences, then, from a normative standpoint, regulators
should lean towards avoiding interfering with individuals’ expression of them.23 A useful
analogy is our regulatory response to risk aversion. We have long understood that
individuals tend to be willing to pay more than the expected loss to shift risk of a
potential loss to another party, at least in some domains. The regulatory response has not
been to work to “debias” individuals or to somehow work around aversion to risk.
Instead, regulators expend resources to ensure that insurance markets are robust so that
22

“There have been some interesting semantic discussions of whether or not, even if it exists, the
endowment effect is formally irrational. One can argue, for example, that once a person's
preference for the item has increased, then acting consistent with that preference is rational.
Similarly, one could argue (perhaps tautologically) that seemingly irrational behavior simply
reflects rational, utility-maximizing behavior among people who share an unexpectedly odd
utility function. Alternatively, one could simply say that observed disparities challenge expected
utility theory as a good model for decision making under uncertainty.”
23

Alternatively, preferences that compel acts that infringe on others’ rights (e.g., A prefers to
steal B’s possessions) should be regulated in ways that protect recognized rights. The main point
here is that regulatory tactics will differ depending on how we interpret the problems that give
rise to the need for intervention.

14
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3047907

individuals can efficiently transfer risk to insurance companies. We do not try to
convince consumers that they should not be willing to pay more than the expected loss
for insurance, but we do work to bolster competitive insurance markets so that consumers
can enjoy maximum surplus from trades given preferences characterized by risk aversion.
In the same way, regulators should acknowledge the possibility that at least some are loss
averse and consider regulatory approaches that allow individuals to efficiently express
these non-standard preferences.
While some researchers are appropriately cautious about the leap to the normative
(see, e.g., Jones and Brosnan 2008: 1988), others assume that the law is well positioned
to remedy irrationality signaled by observed choices that deviate from rational choice
theory predictions. Fried (2013: 1266, fn. 52), for example, claims that “if…refusal to
make obviously superior trades results from the endowment effect…, then…sensible
policy interventions would look to debiasing consumers' irrational attachment to what
they happen to have…” 24 Korobkin (2003) suggests that the government, when
compensating owners for takings, can avoid the inefficiencies caused by endowment
effect by paying fair market value rather than the owner’s valuation (Korobkin 2003).25
Buccafusco and Sprigman (2010: 43-44) suggest that intellectual property policy should
be designed to address reluctance to trade in an effort to avoid “market failure.”

24

In support of this normative claim, Fried cites to Jennifer Arlen and Stephan Tontrup (2015).
Arlen and Tontrup, in their normative discussion, however, assume that reluctance to trade is
caused by a preference to avoid feelings of regret and not by loss aversion. Although Arlen and
Tontrup (2015: 175-178) do not have loss aversion in mind, they seem to mistakenly characterize
regret avoidance as a mistake, describing regret avoidance as a bias in need of a remedy. They
(2015: 153) describe actions in the absence of regret aversion as “rational.” They do this despite
the fact that the authors of regret theory (Loomes and Sugden 1982: 822), which Arlen and
Tontrup cite early on, explicitly characterize the model of regret avoidance as a model of rational
choice.
25

Korobkin (2003: 1265) explains “If the government wishes to promote the efficient use of
resources by redistributing rights if and only if the valuation of those rights by the winners
exceeds the valuation of the losers, but WTA is considered an illegitimate measure of value, then
permitting the community to condemn landowners' rights and requiring it to pay a fixed price
determined by the state might be an appropriate policy.” Korobkin (2003: 1280), however, does
recognize the possibility that reluctance to trade might not be irrational, stating that “the
endowment effect is not obviously ‘irrational’ behavior: a preference for what one has over what
one does not have…is no more troublesome than a preference for chocolate ice cream over
vanilla.”
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Regardless of whether we should consider reluctance to trade as a signal of
irrational preferences, it is important to at least acknowledge the nuances spelled out by
the theories’ authors. The same goes for other observations studied by behavioral
economists. The next subsection summarizes similar problems with the importation of
theories related to preferences over delay across time.
4.2 Inconsistent Time Preferences
Another much discussed behavioral departure from rational choice theory is
observed inconsistency in preferences related to delays that occur at different points in
time (e.g., delays in the near future versus delays in the distant future).26 Rational choice
theory models generally assume an exponential discounting function, which implies that
future consumption impacts current utility less than present consumption. More
specifically, the current value we get for consumption decreases as the delay to
consumption increases. The standard model also assumes consistent levels of patience for
delay over time. For example, if one prefers $100 today over $110 a week from now, the
theory predicts that the individual will prefer $100 in a month over $110 a month and one
week from now.
The empirical literature is replete with documented evidence of observed behavior
that deviates from the standard model’s predictions. One in a long list of anomalies is
sometimes referred to as present bias. Evidence suggests that individual levels of patience
for delay over time are inconsistent.27 In particular, individuals seem more sensitive to
delays closer in time to the present as opposed to delays further out into the future (Cohen
et al. 2016).28 While researchers have observed several other anomalies relative to the

26

See Mas-Colell et al. (1995: 733-736) for a general description of the standard discounting
model.
27

As with most observations studied in economics, disagreement exists over interpretation and
causal mechanisms. Stahl (2013) lists studies that have posed challenges to the validity of
experiments reporting evidence of present bias and offering a rational choice theory explanation
for observed inconsistent time preference.
28

This excellent review catalogs difficulties with measuring individual time preferences.
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standard discounted utility model,29 legal scholars seem especially interested in present
bias.
In light of such observed behavior, behavioral economics theorists have offered
alternatives to the standard discounting model with the goal of increasing the theory’s
predictive power. Interestingly, the theoretical literature got its start with models of
animal behavior (see, e.g., Chung and Herrnstein 1967). Using similar concepts, Thaler
and Shefrin (1981) developed a theory of self-control to explain the use of commitment
devices (e.g., Christmas club savings accounts). Thaler and Shefrin (1981: 393, 404)
explicitly assume that the use of such devices is rational, and they characterize their
theory as a theory of rational behavior. 30 Loewenstein and Prelec (1992: 574-578)
followed with one of the first non-standard economics models that assumes inconsistent
time preferences, modeled using a hyperbolic discounting function, and the ability to
employ commitment devices. The authors do not directly discuss whether the features of
preferences assumed by the model are rational, but they do characterize the deviations
from standard theory in preference terms as opposed to mistakes. 31 Building on Thaler
and Shefrin’s theory of self-control, Fudenberg and Levine (2006) lay out a dual-self
29

Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) provide one of the earliest lists of anomalies.

30

The model assumes two selves: a myopic doer, who derives utility only from current
consumption, and a planner, who is concerned with lifetime utility. The planner rationally
chooses to impose constraints on the doer when the costs of doing so are relatively low.
31

For example, Loewenstein and Prelec (1992: 595) state, “Our model by no means incorporates
all important psychological factors that influence intertemporal choice. For example, like any
model with nonconstant discounting, it yields time-inconsistent behavior or ‘myopia’….
However, it cannot explain the high levels of conflict that such myopic behavior often evokes.
Intertemporal choice often seems to involve an internal struggle for self-command….At the very
moment of succumbing to the impulse to consume, individuals often recognize at a cognitive
level that they are making a decision that is contrary to their long-term self-interest. Mathematical
models of choice do not shed much light on such patterns of cognition and behavior.” They
(1992: 592) do, however, recognize potential conditions for suboptimal choice: “Relative to
normative theory, our model suggests that people may tend to prefer plans that sacrifice the
medium-range future for the sake of the short and the long term. There is nothing clearly wrong
with this, provided that one can commit to an entire plan at the moment of decision. However, if
the optimal plan can be recalculated at later points in time, then the planned sacrifice in midrange
consumption will not take effect…. As a result, a bias in favor of the long and short runs may in
practice yield behavior that is oriented only to the short run.” Furthermore, Loewenstein and
Prelec (1992: 581) observe, “The shape and reference point assumption reflects basic
psychophysical considerations: extra attention to negative aspects of the environment, decreasing
sensitivity to increments in stimuli of increasing magnitude, and cognitive limitations” (emphasis
added).
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model of impulse control. They (2006: 1451) explicitly characterize the preference
assumptions as rational. According to these models, choices that seem irrational might in
fact be rational, reflecting high costs of delayed gratification. Importantly, assuming a
hyperbolic discounting function does not necessarily imply irrational preferences.
Others have modeled inconsistent time discounting as leading to choices that
individuals might regret. This family of models makes various assumptions about the
level of individual awareness about the potential for mistakes. For example, O’Donoghue
and Rabin (2001) posit that individuals are partially naïve. Specially, individuals
understand their future self-control problems, but they underestimate the problems’
magnitude. Some point to these models to explain the “underutilization” of available
commitment devices (e.g., investing one’s savings in illiquid assets). Alternatively,
Laibson (1997) constructs a model to explain behavior in contexts where individuals
cannot access a perfect commitment device. Laibson (1997) argues that preferences
characterized by hyperbolic discounting lead individuals to suboptimal decisions.32
These two models illustrate the diversity in the literature—some models suggest
non-standard preferences and make no claims about mistakes, while others assume that
individuals adopt techniques to avoid mistakes, and still others claim that behavior that
does not comport the predictions of standard theory reflects errors in judgment. Despite
the perspective of many who apply these various theories to law, reviewers (Frederick et
al. 2002) of the discounting literature have explicitly noted that “it is unclear whether any
of the [discounted utility model] ‘anomalies’ should be regarded as mistakes.” Further
complicating the picture, researchers have generated a large literature critiquing the
methods used to measure time preferences (see, e.g., Cohen et al. 2016).
Despite the diversity of model types in the economics literature, scholars who
apply behavioral economics to law often claim that inconsistent time preferences are
irrational. Wright and Stone (2012: 1530), for example, refer generally to hyperbolic
discounting as a “willpower error.” Similarly, in an article published by a law review,
Rizzo and Whitman (2009), both economists, characterize inconsistent time preferences
32

For example, if I cannot use a commitment device to start saving for the future, I might plan to
start saving in a year, but when the time comes I chose to consume and not save and make
another plan to start saving in the future. And, so on. I never save, which puts my future self in a
bind.
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as evidence of irrationality despite the diverse characterizations in the economics
literature. 33 Gandhi (2008: 140) likewise labels hyperbolic discounters as irrational.
Bowers (2008: 815) describes hyperbolic discounting as “the product of the inability to
think and to act rationally in the face of pain.” Viscusi (2007: 239) describes
experimental findings of hyperbolic discounting as documenting “intertemporal
irrationality.” Yahya (2006: 73) claims that “psychologists and economists have long
held the idea that people irrationally prefer small present gains to larger future gains.”
Hanson and Yosifon (2004: 43-44) describe hyperbolic discounting as a “choice bias,”
which they define as a “mental contamination” that we wish to avoid but that is difficult
to eliminate. Farber (2003: 328) describes inconsistent time preferences as seemingly
irrational. Ainslie and Monterosso (2003: 831) claim that “most people would call
irrational” preferences characterized by a hyperbolic discounting function.34
Characterizing inconsistent time preferences as irrational leads some researchers
to jump too easily to regulatory methods designed to correct mistakes or to ignore
preferences in policy making. If models that assume rationality are accurate explanations
of observed choices, then policies might be best geared toward reducing the costs of
commitment devices and lowering the costs of delayed gratification. This might require
getting a good handle on factors that increase such costs to be able to best fashion
policies to reduce them. Regulators might also consider methods to increase individual
awareness of the best available commitment devices.
If, on the other hand, we mistakenly assume inconsistent time preferences are
mistakes, policy prescriptions might tilt unnecessarily in the direction of costly
information dissemination aimed at increasing awareness of inconsistent time preferences
or, perhaps worse, limiting choices perceived by regulators to satisfy irrational desires for
33

While Rizzo and Whitman (2009: 913-914) state, “People who engage in hyperbolic
discounting may exhibit time inconsistency: they will make decisions about future trade-offs and
then reverse those decisions later…. Behavioral economists take this sort of inconsistency as
evidence of irrationality,” the authors do not cite to any authority for this claim. They point the
reader, however, to Frederick et al. (2002) to support their definition of hyperbolic discounting.
Recall that these authors express doubts over whether inconsistent time preferences should be
considered mistakes.
34

They state, “This curve gives preference a property that most people would call irrational—an
innate tendency to switch from better-later goods to poorer-earlier goods simply as the earlier
goods become imminently available.” (p. 831)
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instant gratification. The literature contains various sorts of potentially misguided
normative claims grounded in the characterization of inconsistent time preferences as
irrational. Gandhi (2008: 142), for example, argues that government can aid irrational
students plagued by inconsistent time preferences by providing upfront tuition subsidies.
Ainslie and Monterosso (2003) recognize potential benefits of using law to correct
mistakes made by hyperbolic discounters but list reasons why achieving this goal might
be impossible. Perhaps most troubling, Viscusi (2007: 239-240) assumes that present bias
is irrational and argues that environmental policy makers should ignore their constituents’
preferences.35 These sorts of normative claims fail to recognize the lack of consensus in
the literature related to whether present bias leads to regrettable mistakes (Frederick et al.
2002).
Importantly, characterizing a behavioral model’s assumptions as either grounded
in mistakes or in non-standard preferences does not necessarily lead us to particular
policy prescriptions. Mitchell (2005) lays out a number of reasons why policies designed
to correct mistakes are not necessarily normatively appealing. Similarly, the absence of
potential mistakes does not automatically trigger a hands-off approach. If our aim is to
maximize total social welfare, we sometimes do best by allowing individuals to make
choices in line with their preferences. In others cases, we can justify regulation in the
absence of mistakes if, for example, markets are hampered by imperfections such as
externalities and imperfect information. Furthermore, we might collectively decide that
some preferences are socially unacceptable and that choices driven by them should be
punished. The main point is that optimal regulation depends heavily on the factors that
drive choices; if we are wrong about what drives behavior, regulation might do more
harm than good.
This Part provided examples of mistakes about mistakes from two behavioral
economics literatures that are commonly imported into legal scholarship. Although these

35

Specifically, Viscusi (2007: 239-240, fn. 85) states, “Given that people's revealed intertemporal
preferences display hyperbolic discounting, should policy prescriptions for discounting practices
reflect these preferences? My view is that this form of intertemporal irrationality should not be
incorporated into official discounting practices, which instead should be based on the opportunity
cost of capital rather than the irrational, myopic concerns embodied in hyperbolic discounting.”
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sorts of mistaken applications appear quite frequently, they are avoidable. The next Part
offers steps scholars can take to avoid such mistakes.
5 Avoiding Mistaken Applications
To reduce the risk of mistakenly claiming that assumed preferences are irrational
or that an applied theory assumes individual choices reflect psychological mistakes,
scholars should always carefully consult the primary source of the applied theory, resist
resolving ambiguity by assuming that the applied theory assumes mistake-making, and
gain an understanding of the full scope of the relevant economics literature. Given the
field’s young age, behavioral economics literatures generally posit a number of possible
theories for the same observed behavior, only some of which assume psychological
mistakes as opposed to non-standard preferences or other sorts of behavioral drivers.
Consult and cite to primary sources. To avoid confusion, best practice requires
directly consulting and citing to the primary source, keeping in mind the distinction
between non-standard preferences and mistakes, and other sorts of theoretical drivers of
behavior. Unfortunately, misinterpretation is quite common; thus, avoid relying on
others’ descriptions and interpretations. If a theory author is not explicit about the nature
of the theory’s assumptions, determine whether the author makes any implicit
assumptions along these lines. In addition, avoid “applying” observed behavior. Instead,
apply theories about what drives observed behavior.36
Resist generalizing behavioral economics as a theory of errors. In the face of
uncertainty about the nature of theoretical assumptions, avoid concluding that assumed
features of preferences, beliefs, and choices signal irrationality.

That a theory’s

assumptions differ in some way from those built into standard economic theories does not
necessarily imply irrationality. At a minimum, defend claims of irrationality or mistaken
choices. Explain why we might assume that individuals acting under the applied model’s
assumptions might regret their choices.
Apply literatures, not single theories. Given the field’s young age, very few, if
any, research questions have definitive answers. All behavioral economics literatures
36

For more on this, see Zeiler (2010).
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contain multiple theories designed to explain what drives a single observed behavior.
Some assume non-standard but rational preferences. Some predict that individuals will
commit psychological errors. Some suggest other sorts of behavioral drivers. Unless a
literature has reached a consensus around what explains the relevant observed behavior, it
is important to describe variations in theories that find support in reported data. In some
cases, this is best accomplished by pointing the reader to a recent literature review, after,
of course, verifying that the review accurately describes each theory. Reviewers
sometimes get it wrong.
Additional difficulty is introduced by the fact that definitions of “rational
preference” and “rationality” offered in the literature lack consistency. No hard and fast
rules exist for identifying irrationality. Importers of behavioral economic theories might
rely on the theorists’ characterizations of posited preference features as rational or
irrational, but these claims are, of course, not binding on importers, at least in the sense
that importers are free to disagree with the author’s characterizations. Thus, perhaps at a
minimum, importers should make it a practice to disclose all relevant theories along with
the theorists’ characterizations of preferences as rational or irrational, and argue for or
against those characterizations.

Given that many literatures contain collections of

theories that, taken together, recognize the possibility of both mistakes and non-standard
preferences, appliers should strive to accurately summarize the state of the literature.
Once the reader has a basic understanding of the flavors of different theories, importers
are free to offer normative claims based on hypotheticals that assume that one or more of
the posited theories actually explain the observed behavior.
6 Conclusion
The field of behavioral economics, while relatively new, has come a long way in
its efforts to improve the predictive power of economic theory. Improvements are
achieved, in some cases, by modifying assumptions of the standard model. Although
these modifications take a variety of forms, behavioral economics mistakenly has come
to be known as the theory of irrationality. This mischaracterization misses the fact that
many behavioral theories assume perfect rationality. For at least some of these rational
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behavioral models, assumption modifications focus on the introduction of non-standard
preferences, such as loss aversion, hyperbolic discounting, and other-regarding
preferences.
What might explain overgeneralizations of behavioral economics as a set of
theories rooted in mistake making? Although this difficult question is not taken up in this
Essay, a couple conjectures might act as useful starting points. First, the earliest importers
of behavioral economics into law did not always recognize the theories’ nuances. For
example, although Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (1998) distinguished between mistakes
(e.g., bounded rationality) and non-standard preferences (e.g., bounded self-interest), they
imprecisely characterized the endowment effect at an example of bounded rationality
even though Tversky and Kahneman (1991) were agnostic. Unfortunately, scholars often
cite to imprecise characterizations of original work rather than to the original work itself
(Klass and Zeiler 2013). Second, as Klass and Zeiler (2013, pp. 55-59) suggest,
behavioral economics theories were “the right theor[ies] at the right time.”37 For many
years, legal scholars resisted general claims that neoclassical economics models predicted
optimal outcomes in the absence of heavy-handed regulation. Theories of mistakes
arising from behavioral economics reinvigorated the need for regulation. Law was once
again a vital component in the quest for optimal outcomes. This outlook might have
compelled the generalizations and imprecision that arose as behavioral economics was
voraciously imported into legal analyses. Again though, much work is required to test
these ad hoc conjectures.
Mistakes about psychological mistakes have important implications when it
comes to normative claims importers draw from descriptive theories. When those who
generate policy prescriptions fail to recognize that deviations from behavioral predictions
of standard theory might be due to non-standard, rational preferences as opposed to
mistakes, they risk proposing “fixes” that do more harm than good. Interventions
designed to help individuals correct mistakes might waste limited government resources,
lead to confusion and steer individuals away from their preferred choices. Careful
application of behavioral economics theories requires consulting and citing to primary
37

Klass and Zeiler (2013) focus on endowment theory, but the same argument can be generalized
to behavioral economics theory.
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sources, resisting generalizing behavioral theories as theories of mistakes and applying
literatures rather than individual theories. By distinguishing between psychological
mistakes and non-standard preferences, importers can make more effective use of
behavioral economics insights.
Calabresi (2016: 16) reminds us that “the world as it is often …represents worthy
relationships and behaviors that the theory…does not explain. And it is essential…that
such data from the world as it is be used to reform the theory…because what the
empiricist describes is often not irrational but highly worthy and should not only be
retained by also explained.” Calabresi focuses here on rational choice theorists’ mistakes
relating to labeling behavior that does not comport with rational choice theory predictions
as irrational and then offering prescriptions for better aligning behavior with such
predictions. Calabresi’s advice, however, applies equally well to those who import
behavioral economics into legal scholarship and policy. Valid normative claims require a
clear understanding of the factors that drive choices.
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